Kennon claims are difficult to maintain
- Turning then to Kennon, the rationale for a contributions adjustment as a consequence of family violence was explained by Fogarty and Lindenmayer JJ at 84,294:
Put shortly, our view is that where there is a course of violent conduct by one party towards the other during the marriage which is demonstrated to have had a significant adverse impact upon that party’s contributions to the marriage, or, put the other way, to have made his or her contributions significantly more arduous than they ought to have been, that is a fact which a trial judge is entitled to take into account in assessing the parties’ respective contributions within s.79. We prefer this approach to the concept of “negative contributions” which is sometimes referred to in this discussion.
- And at 84,294 – 84,295:
It is essential to bear in mind the relatively narrow band of cases to which these considerations apply. To be relevant, it would be necessary to show that the conduct occurred during the course of the marriage and had a discernible impact upon the contributions of the other party. It is not directed to conduct which does not have that effect and of necessity it does not encompass (as in Ferguson) conduct related to the breakdown of the marriage (basically because it would not have had a sufficient duration for this impact to be relevant to contributions).
- In Spagnardi the Full Court referred to Kennon and the necessity to show that the conduct had a “discernible impact” on the party’s contributions but noted that, there was an “insufficiency of evidence” . Their Honours then continued:
As Kennon has established, it is necessary to provide evidence to establish:
- The incidence of domestic violence;
- The effect of domestic violence; and
- Evidence to enable the court to quantify the effect of that violence upon the parties [sic] capacity to “contribute” as defined by section 79(4).
- Their Honours further noted at  that there was a “complete absence of evidence as to how the husband’s conduct affected her ability to contribute”. At first blush the reference in Spagnardi to “quantification” seems to elevate the need for an evidentiary nexus or “discernible impact” between the conduct complained of and its effect on the party’s ability to make relevant contributions, requiring expert or actuarial evidence of the effect of the violence. That impression is reinforced by their Honour’s reference to and comparison with the husband’s failure to adduce evidence to demonstrate the impact on the value of the house by his renovations and improvements at  where their Honours said:
An absence of quantification was also apparent in the appellant’s case. While the husband went to great lengths to identify each of the tasks undertaken by him in connection with renovations and improvements to the matrimonial property, he failed to provide evidence of the direct effect of his endeavours upon the value of that property.
- This uncomfortable analogy does not illuminate what “quantification” of the effect of violence on contributions might look like. It suggests something more than the evidence by the victim spouse. We struggle to understand what that “quantification” evidence might be beyond that given by the victim spouse as to the incidence and effect of the violence as identified in Spagnardi in the first two dot points at . Furthermore, we fail to see how this third step accords with the decision in Kennon which the Full Court in Spagnardi said governed the situation. Perhaps the use of the word “quantification” is infelicitous and has unintentionally added a gloss to the ratio in Kennon when, in truth, the Court in Spagnardi was merely reinforcing the need for there to be an evidentiary nexus between the conduct complained of and the capacity (and or effort expended) to make relevant contributions. And, depending upon the nature of the violence established, in the absence of express evidence about the effect that violence had on the victim spouse’s contributions, how difficult it might be for the Court to draw inferences which would establish the evidentiary nexus (see Spagnardi at ). But we did not have the benefit of argument on the point (nor it seems did the primary judge) and prefer to express no final view about it.
- In any event, the primary judge gave no consideration to the inferences that might properly be drawn from the wife’s albeit limited evidence as to the effect on her of the husband’s violence taken in conjunction with her evidence of the severity of the violence. In this respect although there was evidence about violent behaviour by the wife, it was not the husband’s case that this warranted an adjustment in his favour. Perhaps this is why there is no reference to this evidence in the trial reasons.
- Turning then to the frequency and severity of the violence, we are troubled that the primary judge seems to have dismissed all incidents of violence towards the wife except that which resulted in the wife’s wrist being broken by the husband, apparently because her evidence was uncorroborated.
- It is well settled that a party does not require his or her evidence to be corroborated before evidence of family violence can be accepted. A decade ago the Full Court said in Amador & Amador  FamCAFC 196;(2009) 43 Fam LR 268 at :
Where domestic violence occurs in a family it frequently occurs in circumstances where there are no witnesses other than the parties to the marriage, and possibly their children. We cannot accept that a court could never make a positive finding that such violence occurred without there being corroborative evidence from a third party or a document or an admission. We have not been referred to any authority in support of such a proposition.
- The primary judge’s approach to the wife’s claim for an adjustment as a consequence of family violence was undoubtedly affected by the confused approach she adopted at trial and as reflected in her summary of argument filed in the appeal. Nonetheless it seems to us that his Honour’s approach to the issue of family violence as demonstrated in his reasons is persuasive of the conclusion that he misdirected his attention from the “discernible impact” of the husband’s violence on the wife’s capacity to make contributions focussing instead on there being no evidence allowing “quantification” of that effect. However, for an abundance of caution given the absence of a transcript, we cannot conclusively say that his decision to make no “Kennon” type adjustment was wrong. That argument and its ultimate determination must await the remitted trial.
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